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POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES. By William W. Crosskey. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. xi, viii, 1410. $20.00.
This is a challenging work of constitutional heresy. Orthodox dogma
has taught us that the Founding Fathers were devoted to their states; that
in 1787 they struck a compromise between their preference for local government and a need for national union by creating a federal system with a
central government of enumerated and limited powers. All this, Professor
Crosskey 1 tells us, is snare and delusion. Instead of a federal system, the
Fathers deliberately created a central government of virtually unlimited
power. National power was designed for all local gainful activity without
regard to any relationship to interstate commerce; Congress may not merely
tax and spend but also may regulate for the "general welfare"; the United
States Supreme Court may review local state courts in their application of
the common law to purely local transactions.
This plan for a unitary national government was perverted, we are
now told, when the Covenant fell in the hands of evil men-Madison and
the other Jeffersonians-who, intent on preserving local control of slavery,
led the Court and the country astray by sophistical reasoning and falsification of the records of the Constitutional Convention. This exhaustive twovolume treatise embodies fifteen years of intensive research designed to
right that wrong and restore to the national Government the power which
the Fathers planned.
Although this work condemns much of the work of the Supreme Court,
it presents a magnificent tribute to the foresight of the Founding Fathers.
At virtually every point where their intent has been misunderstood, the
original design is much more suited to the author's evaluation of the present
needs of the country than the structure which rests on current readings of
the document. There emerges a "simple and flexible" scheme of government which is "wholly free from all those useless complexities, and surprising deficiencies, that seem to characterize it under the Supreme Court's
familiar theories; and beyond all doubt, the scheme of the Constitution is
one far better fitted to meet the governmental needs of this country at the
present day than the scheme the Supreme Court's theories describe"
(p. vii).
Heresy, at least in constitutional law, is a precious thing which we
shun to our loss. If Professor Crosskey's work is sound this is indeed the
most important book on the Constitution which scholarship has yet pro1. Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
(280)
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duced. This drives us to an examination of the underpinning on which
this work rests.
One might suppose that such a revolution in constitutional interpretation could only be based on a discovery as dramatic and compelling as the
unearthing of forgotten records of the Constitutional Convention. Professor Crosskey's case is not based on such secondary sources; it rests
primarily on deductions from the very words of the Constitution. This
solution to the mystery has been lying in plain view for over a century
and a half, but its significance has not been perceived since the meanings
of crucial words of the Constitution have been eroded with the passing of
time. To meet this problem, Professor Crosskey has by prodigious effort
created a "specialized dictionary" derived from eighteenth century usage
of these terms. A second tool is a set of rules of statutory construction
which are culled from contemporary legal sources. When these meanings
are read into the Constitution and the proper rules of statutory construction are applied, there emerges a document of strange visage which Professor Crosskey aptly calls our "unknown constitution."
Vital to the author's reading of the Constitution as a charter for a
unitary national government is his re-interpretation of the preposition
"among" as it appears in the grant to Congress of power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." The scope of national power
over commerce has traditionally been based on the premise that the constitutional grant relates to transactions which concern two or more states;
as it is customarily put, the commerce must be "interstate." 2 This view,
says Professor Crosskey, erroneously reads "among the several states" to
mean the same as "between the several states." However, in the author's
specialized dictionary, "among" cannot mean "between" but bears the
much broader meaning of "throughout." An example of the acceptable
usage of this word is a news account in 1785 that there had been "a severe
hurricane among the Windward Islands." It is "needless to point out that
the hurricane blew 'within' the several islands of the Windward group quite
as much as it blew 'between' them" (p. 53). There are many pages of
similar examples which provide the support for the conclusion that the
national commerce power need not be based upon any interstate relationship
or effect, but applies to local commerce within any of the states.
Professor Crosskey also devotes a chapter (pp. 84-114) to examples
of eighteenth-century usage of the word "commerce" as embracing all types
of gainful activity. These researches lead the author to conclude that the
commerce clause, by the inescapable meaning of its words, created at the
outset a central government with power over all local businesses such as
2. Earlier writers on the Constitution have urged and the Court has adopted
reading of the commerce clause sufficiently broad for Congressional control of an
interconnected national economic life. E.g., HAMILTON AND ADAIR, THE PoWER TO

GovERN (1937); Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than; One,

47 H- v. L. Rxv. 1335 (1934). Cf., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (national control over farmer's feeding of home-grown grain). None of these readings
of the commerce clause approaches the sweep of Professor Crosskey's construction.
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smithies or alehouses, without regard to any economic impact on national
economic life.
Professor Crosskey finds that other clauses of the Constitution, when
properly read, support his view that the Constitution contemplated a unitary
central government. An important example is the provision in Article
1, Section 8 that "The Congress shall have Power To lay aid collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and Provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States .

."

It has been a

mistake to conclude that this reference to "general Welfare" specifies one
of the permissible objectives of the power of taxation; this is a grant of
regulatory power over any subject which Congress deems will promote
the "general welfare."
In Crosskey's view further light is shed on national power by a correct
reading of the outlawry of state laws "impairing the obligation of contracts." The Supreme Court has been in error in concluding that this provision merely bars impairment of contracts executed prior to the legislation
in question. Instead, the words of the Constitution plainly bar any state law
which would restrict the enforceability of future contracts such as a statute
of frauds, a statute of limitations, or regulation of usury (pp. 352-360).
This reading, of course, cripples state legislative power; but this merely
shows that Congress, and not the states, was designed to be the proper
source of future legislation. Thus the author achieves a "perfect fit" between the various constitutional provisions (p. 1173).
These are not, by any means, all of the constitutional provisions which
Professor Crosskey finds have been totally misunderstood: the book devotes
large sections to unorthodox interpretations of the power of the Supreme
Court, the scope of the Bill of Rights, and the true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In order to examine more closely Professor Crosskey's methods, an
appropriate focal point is his reading of the commerce clause. The soundness of this conclusion affects the plausibility of much of the rest of the
book, for limitations in the grant of power to regulate commerce would itself seriously jeopardize the author's assertions that unlimited regulatory
power was contemplated by the "general welfare" clause and that the
Supreme Court was authorized to override state courts in their application
of the common law to local transactions.
This brings us back to Professor Crosskey's researches into the acceptable usage of the preposition "among" in the phrase "Commerce . .
among the several States." It must be conceded that Crosskey has proved
that this phrase, standing alone, could have been employed in the allinclusive sense which he urges. The evidence proves no more.
To get behind Professor Crosskeys' assertion that his "very extensive
study of eighteenth-century sources, British and American, has failed to
bring to light" evidence that "among the states" in the commerce clause
could be used in the interstate sense (p. 51), it is necessary to look into
eighteenth-century writing. Fortunately, Professor Ernest Brown under-
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took this chore.3 He reports that, without extensive research, examples of
the use of the word "among" in the sense which Professor Crosskey denies
to it appear repeatedly in such obvious sources as the Federalist and the
writings of James Wilson. Perhaps the most striking of these examples
occurs in the Articles of Confederation. Article IV guaranteed the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states and their right
of free ingress and regress to and from any other state, with the stated
objective the "better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union . . ."
Thus, the charter which preceded the present Constitution appears to have
4
used the word "among" in the "inadmissible" interstate sense.
When relatively brief examination uncovers such instances, ominous
questions arise as to why Professor Crosskey's years of research apparently
did not find them. It is also disturbing that Professor Crosskey did not
take account of the obvious point that the word "among" in the commerce
clause was rendered appropriate, if not dictated, by the multiplicity of the
relationships of the thirteen states. "Between" comes from the same root
as "twain" and literally speaks only of a relationship involving two objects;
for a larger number of relationships the correct word is "among." r To
speak of correspondence "between the two of us and among us three" is
hardly inadmissible use of language either now or in the eighteenth century.
If this discussion of word-usage seems unduly prolonged or trivial, it
must be remembered that a very large part of the Crosskey case rests on
his assertion that the words of the Constitution cannot bear the interpretation of relationship among the states which has been traditionally placed
upon them. In Crosskey's words: ". . . the conclusive piece of evidence
will be the Constitution itself, read as our specialized dictionary of words
and ideas will require" (p. 12).
Even more distressing than this overstatement of his case for the true
meaning of the words used in the Constitution is the author's failure to give
a balanced account of the relationship between the Constitution and the
needs and ideals from which it grew. In Crosskey's words, "
.
the
3. Brown, Book Review, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1439, 1449-51 (1954).
4. In glancing at the Records of tle Federal Convention reporting the pro-

ceedings of the first day in which business was transacted, the following additional
instance practically leaped from the page. Randolph, in opening the discussion, referred to various reasons why the Articles of Confederation had not been made
stronger, including the fact that "no commercial discord had arisen among any
states. . .

."

(Italics added.)

I

FARRAND, REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

18 (1911). Farrand notes that this summary was in Randolph's own hand. Ibid.
n.7. In the context of the debates as a whole I find it impossible to read this
statement other than as a reference to relationships among the states. Indeed, the
debates on the commerce clause dealt primarily with the power which would thereby
be conferred upon Congress to pass a navigation act. See II id. at 449-53, 631.
5. CENTURY DICrIONARY 180 (1914): "Between is nearly equivalent etymologically to by twain, so applying only to two; among refers to more than two; it is

therefore improper to say either anta-ng them both, or between the three." Cf.
JoHxsoN's ENGLISH DICTIONAIY 135 (Chalmers' abridgment of Todd ed., 1839);
BosworH, DIC' rONRY OF THE ANGLO-SAXON LANGUAGE 52, 404 (1838).
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task of putting the Constitution, rightly understood, in context with the
events and institutions which preceded it, has not yet been attempted and
accordingly remains as one of the chief subjects to be dealt with in subsequent volumes of this book" (p. 1174).
In the face of this offering of two large and closely printed volumes it
seems ungrateful indeed to suggest that we should have been given more.
Nor can one quarrel with the presentation of research by installments. The
problem arises only because Professor Crosskey claims that by these volumes he has demonstrated the true meaning of the Constitution to a point
where "there cannot be a doubt" (p. 1161) and contrary views can be dismissed as "wholly imaginary" (p. 1173) or "little less than absurd" (p.
499), or as "almost childlike" (p. 391). Professor Crosskey thus invites
the Court and Congress immediately to revise their views of the structure
of the Constitution although vital evidence of the purport of the Constitution is not presented. This order of proof is the more difficult to understand since these two volumes are not confined to the meaning of the text
of the original document, but run on to proclaim the "true" meaning of
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unless the words of the Constitution are utterly compelling one cannot fairly reach final conclusions on its meaning without facing this question: On what evidence is it plausible to suggest that men who in drafting
the Articles of Confederation were so averse to central government that
they withheld legislative power even over taxation or foreign commerce
should choose ten years later to create a government with complete regulatory power over all local business affairs?
Crosskey does not deny us a "foretaste" of the evidence which he
promises for later volumes. The book refers to "commercial chaos" in the
states prior to 1787 (p. 85), and apparently seeks to leave the impression
that national regulation of local commerce was therefore demanded. Available evidence, however, seems to be primarily concerned with the repudiation of debts which accompanied the post-war deflation; this problem, of
course, was met by the specific provision of Article 1, Section 9, prohibiting
state laws which impaired the obligation of contracts.
Crosskey also builds an elaborate case for the receptiveness of the lawyers of the time for a single body of mercantile law, and points to the
popularity of Mansfield's work in furthering the lex mercatoria (p. 33).
This material would indeed be relevant to the intended scope of national
legislative power if lawyers of the time generally contemplated that the
"law of merchants" should be established by legislation. Such an implication, however, would be misleading. As Professor Crosskey himself seems
to recognize at another point (pp. 556-59), the law of merchants was conceived as a body of customs followed by merchants which was implemented
not by legislation but through recognition by the courts. Local state courts
could ascertain and apply these general mercantile practices; an appreciable
movement to codify commercial laws into statutes followed the drafting of
the Constitution by a century. Much less is there evidence that the Con-
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stitution of 1787 was designed as a tool for national legislation codifying
business law.
Professor Crosskey points to the fact that at the time of the formation
of the Constitution the country was in the midst of a post-war depression
and draws the conclusion that this fact "naturally increased the demand that
the nation take over the entire government of business" (p. 496). Although such a reaction seems "natural" today, one could hardly draw the
same conclusion for 1787 without ample proof. But at this point Crosskey's discussion trails off, as it does so often at crucial points, into promises
of more in a "later volume." In sum, Crosskey has not yet supplied evidence which makes even plausible his assertion that the framers planned
to create a unitary national government with regulatory power over all
local business.
The most disturbing aspect of the book is the handling, if one may use
the word, of the "legislative history" of the Constitution. The difficulty
for Professor Crosskey is that Madison's notes of the proceedings of the
constitutional convention-by far the mhost complete record---conflict with
his views. Therefore, since Crosskey can entertain no doubt of the correctness of his reading of the words of the Constitution, there can be only
one explanation of this discrepancy: Madison's records are false. For
this alleged falsification of the records, Crosskey readily supplies a motive:
Madison's later political role in resisting Federalist versions of the national
power. But the extent of this alleged falsification, and the method by which
it was accomplished, are again left to "later volumes." For Professor
Crosskey's sake alone, one may hope that his proof for these charges will
be prompt and compelling."
It is an astonishing performance, to use the mildest language possible,
to proclaim the "true meaning" of the Constitution while disposing of such
compelling evidence by unproven charges of forgery. Skepticism based
upon the old-fashioned notion that proof should precede verdict is enhanced by numerous instances of Professor Crosskey's agility in leaping to
a conclusion. Thus, at one point he is met by the fact that a statement by
Madison damaging to Crosskey's views was made in the Virginia ratifying
convention and reported by Eliot, whose honor Crosskey has not yet impugned. Crosskey, however, seizes on the fact that Madison spoke in such
a weak voice that his remark had to be repeated. Crosskey concludes that
"the weakness of his delivery in all probability resulted" from his awareness that his statement was false, "and from his consciousness of the in6. Such proof would have to overturn the detailed researches of Max Farrand
which preceded the publication of his Records of the Federal Convention (1911).
Farrand isolated the corrections which Madison made in his notes prior to publication, and noted that most of these "stand out from the page almost as clearly as if
they had been written in red ink." I FAaRAND, Racoans oF ThE FEamAL CoNVENTION xviii (1911). Irving Brant reports that in view of the way Madison's original
notes were folded and bound, substantiation of Crosskey's charges would qualify
Madison as "one of the most accomplished forgers in the world's history," and,
inter alia, would involve duplicating in 1819 the paper and handwriting of thirty-two

years earlier. Book Review, 54 COL. L. REv. 443, 447 (1954).
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herent improbability, to the minds of his hearers, of the supposed fact
which he affirmed" (p. 334). This is, on its face, a breathtaking inference,
even apart from the fact that contemporary records show that Madison at
this time was recovering from an acute illness.1
The treatise doses with these words of promise concerning the forthcoming volumes: ".

. . when, on the basis of the actual evidence, a true

view of all these matters has been built up, it will be found that weight,
not doubt, has been added to the conclusions, as to the true view of the
Constitution itself, which has been presented in the foregoing pages"
(p. 1175). One can indeed share the author's confidence concerning the
content of his conclusions while reserving judgment as to their weight.
One cannot deal tenderly with this performance without compromising
principles which are basic to our profession. Incomplete and garbled reporting of data and the substitution of assertion for proof surely cannot
escape the condemnation which such work would unhesitatingly receive if
it were to appear in other fields of scientific investigation.8 The nature of
the judgment can not be modified even though it must be assumed that these
qualities are not deliberate, but result from an alchemist's zeal to transmute
into gold the supposedly base metal of limited national power.
John Honnold t

AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK. By Mayo Adams
Shattuck and James F. Farr. Second Edition. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1953. Pp. xxv, 610. $10.75.
What, precisely, is Estate Planning? Obviously Mr. Mayo Shattuck
is-or, regrettably one must say, was '-its prime prophet. But just what
is it?
One might say, glibly and cynically, that it is the latest fad in legal
education. There would be much beside cynicism in such a statement.
7. Id. 449-50.
8. These qualities have been found in appalling proportions wherever reviewers
have troubled to dig below the surface of the text. E.g., Brant, 54 COL. L. REV.
443 (1954); Brown, 67 Hv. L. RExv. 1439 (1954); Fairman, 21 U. OF CmI. L. REV.
40 (1953); Goebel, 54 COL. L. REv. 450 (1954); Hart, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 1456
(1954); Nathanson, 49 N.W.L. REv. 118 (1954). Some reviews have praised the
book. E.g., Clark, 21 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 24 (1953); Corbin, 62 YALE L.J. 1137
(1953); Dean, 40 A.B.A.J. 314 (1954); Durham, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 209 (1953);
Heiman and Kelso, 39 IowA L. REv. 138 (1953); Sharp, 20 U. OF Cxi. L. Rlv.
529 (1953); Sharp, 54 COL. L. REv. 439 (1954); Sholley, 28 WAsH. L. REv. 249
(1953).
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. It appears from the preface that Mr. Shattuck's work on the book was terminated by his regretted and premature death; the work was completed by his longtime
friend and colleague, Mr. Farr.
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Every law school has in its curriculum a number of courses which (if they
are properly given) could very well be called courses in Estate Planning.
The instructor in Taxation, in Trusts, in Future Interests, in Wills, may
or may not conspicuously and explicitly stress drafting and planning, but
it is to be supposed that what the intelligent student learns in these courses
about the operation of wills and trusts, and about the impact of estate
taxation, will be his prime store of ammunition when first he comes to
have clients with wills to be drawn. It could not implausibly be argued that
nothing more in the way of Estate Planning is needed. (Does the instructor in Taxation think we should have a course in Tax Evasion?)
There is something else that can be said, however. A character in
Dickens, whose name now escapes me, proposed to write a paper on
Chinese Metaphysics by looking up in the encyclopedia first China and then
Metaphysics, and then proceeding to combine what he had learned. In
that case, as best I remember, the prospects of success appeared dim.
Estate Planning, as now so extensively advertised and promoted, involves
much the same procedure, to be carried on, we hope, under rather more
competent auspices. It is, precisely, the combining.
I should suppose that a fair statement of what Estate Planning is
involves two steps. First, it presupposes a student with a substantial
training in the subjects of Wills, Future Interests, Trusts, and Estate
Taxation. Then, and only then, it supposes the application of the learning
so acquired to the consideration of what kinds of dispositions of property
are, in a given case (or perhaps in typical cases), best adapted to secure
the optimum disposition of an individual's post-mortem affairs. "Optimum
disposition" here, I suppose, means the one that best carries out the individual's desires, best protects his family in the various contingencies, foreseen and unforeseen, that are bound to occur, and at the same time avoids
tax expense as far as that is possible consistently with the major objectives
just stated.
The "and only then" is of major importance. It conditions rigidly
what can be done in a course on Estate Planning. (And, as will be suggested in a moment, what should go into a treatise on the subject.) Most
importantly, it makes it clear that a course in Estate Planning must be an
additionto the curriculum, and cannot be a substitute for something already
there. This is likely to be overlooked (or evaded) on two levels. The
first is the very stupid level of thinking that you can start with Estate
Planning, and so eliminate those tedious, old-fashioned, and quite unpolicyladen subjects of Wills, Trusts, and so on. (Here one thinks of the
college that had a course in Elementary Greek and one in Advanced Greek.
This seemed to the Authorities too much Greek, so the course in Elementary Greek was abolished.)
On the second, and more sophisticated level, you encounter the realization that the basic information has to be imparted somewhere, but also the
realization that curriculum committees are not likely to be enthusiastic
about allotting more time to the Property Department. Hence the attempt
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to stuff Wills, Trusts and the other basic disciplines all into one course.
All this-and Planning too! A noble experiment, but one that may overlook the fact that courses, like other human devices, are apt to blow up
when the internal pressure gets too great.2 (With all the admiration I
have for Mr. Casner's casebook on Estate Planning, I cannot help think-

ing that it is plagued somewhat by this difficulty. Despite the myriad
varieties of learning with which it is packed, he may still not have been able
to put everything into it, since I am told that he finds it necessary to
bootleg into his course a little foreign material on Future Interests and the

like.)
These observations, some may think, do not bear on the Shattuck and
Farr book. But I believe they do. This is from every standpoint of performance a first rate book. I have read it with constant interest and profit,
and with a constant awareness of the high level of its writing and thinking.
It is in a sense too good a book to review; perhaps that is why I am tempted
not to dwell on its merits but rather to indulge in the collateral reflections
it induces. Yet, after all, I think the book has ultimately failed to solve
the basic Estate Planning dilemma: just what is it we are trying to do?
We first encounter a vigorous and appealing description of the role of
estate planners. Almost inspirational, one is tempted to say, so highly
do the authors rate this among the useful arts. The career of a promising
young man is traced with loving care from the early days when all he can
afford is insurance 8 to take care of the contingency of his premature death,
up to the happy days when he is rich and can afford a board of high-powered
advisers (including, one is happy to say, a lawyer) to plan his estate. Save
for what I confess seems to me some exaggeration of the importance and
difficulty of the process, all this is admirable. (Perhaps, though, I should
be more likely to think it useful to my son than to my lawyer.)
Presently, however, the emphasis shifts to the various branches of substantive law, a knowledge of which is essential to the framing of the estate
plan. There is a study of the law of Trusts, Wills, Future Interests, and,
of course, Taxation. Incidentally, it may be suggested as one of the little
ironies of this book that almost its major theme is that the estate plan
should not be unduly warped by the zeal to save a few pennies in taxesa very sound notion-and yet the authors proceed to devote more pages to
taxation than to anything else. An excellent summary of tax law, if one
2. See Dean Ritchie's very sensible remarks on the subject in 7 J. LEGAL EDUC.
89 (1954).
3. Our authors set an extraordinarily high value on the understanding of insurance and assume that the staff of estate planners will include an insurance expert.
They are palpably enthusiasts and I wonder if they may not have, as enthusiasts
will, a little overestimated the value of some things with which they deal. I should
assume that a competent lawyer, setting up in the estate planning business, could
readily master the relevant information about insurance policies. The picture the
authors present of a group of three or four-maybe an attorney, an accountant, a
business adviser, and an insurance broker-gathered together in solemn conclave to
plan Mr. Smith's will, to me at times nearly verges on the preposterous. What kind
pf broth will result?
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somewhat doomed by the fact that tax law changes faster than books can
be run through the press.
All this in 310 pages. It is too much. Such an attempt is bound to
lay itself open to the criticism that in attempting the impossible one is likely
to fall short of the possible. Here the disciplines attempted to be subsumed,
no matter how expertly, defy the process by their very bulk. The resulting
picture is definitely fragmentary. And in the process-perhaps because of
its difficulty-the authors often betray (though I regret to use such a nasty
word) a marked provincialism.
Two instances will suffice. For one, the law of Trusts seems to begin
and end with Mr. Austin Scott. I have taught over and over from various
editions of his casebook and thumbed his treatise from end to end and back
again, so that no one is more aware of his wisdom and his scholarshipand yet there are other writers on Trusts. For example, I query the wisdom of recommending so broadly to readers everywhere reliance on the
doctrine of "independent significance." (A doctrine, incidentally, apparently first stated by a New York court, 4 and first given wide currency by
an article by the late Dean Evans.5 ) In my own teaching I have grave
difficulty in explaining just what is an act of independent significance. And
it seems to me somewhat hard to think that when a testator modifies his
trust, knowing full well that it will radically modify the disposition of the
residue of his will, he is doing an act of non-testamentary significance. The
draftsman in California, New Mexico or Illinois will do well to consult
his local precedents.
Again, in the pages dealing with the recondite subject of Future Interests and, in particular, with that immemorial bugbear, which I should
think of supreme importance to estate planners, known as the Rule against
Perpetuities, we find the authors committed exclusively to the gospel according to Leach. 6 This is not very surprising; no one else has had, first,
the nerve, and, second, the skill, to attempt putting perpetuities into a nutshell. Still, others have touched on the subject. Perhaps what really
disappoints me is that, rather oddly-unless it is a matter of chronologythere seems to be no mention of the heresy which of late years Leach has
been busily promoting, whereby the validity of remainders is to be determined by whether they in fact vest within a life in being and 21 years,
rather than whether they must, as of the time of their creation, necessarily
vest within that period. In consequence, the Rule is changed from a rather
difficult but still comprehensible canon of policy, under which all gifts are
given equal treatment and can be held valid or not as of the date when the
instrument takes effect, into a gamble in which the validity of a remainder
4. Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N.Y. 9 (1857).
5. Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary Act,
25 COL. L. Rnv. 879 (1925).
6. See Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Ride's Reign of Terror,
65 HARv. L. REv. 721 (1952).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

290

[Vol. 103

may be determined by how long Aunt Sally lives. For example, if on the
same day two wills take effect, one leaving Blackacre to Aunt Sally for life
and then to the children of Brother Bill who reach 25, the other leaving
Greenacre to Aunt Susie and then to the children of Brother Ben on the
same terms, it is clear that (brothers Bill and Ben being alive) both remainders are bad at common law. Under the New Look, however, the
gift to Bill's children may be bad, though they all qualify in 22 years, while
the gift to Ben's may be good though they don't reach 25 for another 75
years.
I understand that Mr. Leach's idea 7 has been adopted by the Massachusetts legislature; all Pennsylvania lawyers know that a similar idea was
incorporated (most unfortunately, I am bound to think) in our Estates
Act of 1947.8 Many of them are wondering, no doubt, just what the statute
means and how it should affect their draftsmanship. (Very little, perhaps,
since obviously all limitations good at common law must be good under the
statute, and there are, it would seem, relatively few situations in which a
good lawyer will wish to let his client take a gamble.) Perhaps they
wonder, as certainly I do, what will happen if the remainderman produces
in court a hardy centenarian with a long white beard, proves his age,
and, though he is a complete stranger to the parties in interest, offers him
in evidence as the life in being. (Plaintiff's Exhibit A.) There is nothing
in the statute to forbid.
These are minor comments 9 on the authors' attempt to teach rudiments
by the way. They are not important save as they raise a problem very
pertinent to the many proposed courses in Estate Planning: if you don't
try to teach the rudiments (and I am sure you can't) just what do you
do? In the case of a book, I suspect you do what the authors have done
so well, yet to my mind without complete successs. Frankly, if I were
faced with a difficult problem in this area, I doubt if it is Shattuck and Farr
I should consult. I should go to Scott on Trusts or Simes on Future Interests for the relevant law; from there on I should rely on my own
judgment.
In the case of a course, I should think the most that could be done
would be to give a seminar open only to those who have done well in Future
Interests, Taxation, Trusts and Wills. The seminar would be based on the
analysis of individual problems. How such a course could be given to a
large group in the ordinary way, is hard to see.
Philip Mechem t
7. Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation, 70 L.Q. REv. 478 (1954).

8.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit.

20, § 301.4 et seq. (1950).

9. For a lucid and sensible discussion of the matter, see Simes, Is the Rule
Against Perpetuities Doomed?, 52 Mica. L. REv. 179 (1953).

t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING. By Reed Dickerson.
and Company. Boston, 1954. Pp. 149. $4.95.

Little, Brown

It is time, long past time, that we face facts concerning legislative
drafting. An infinitesimally small percentage of the bar can draft a statute
satisfactorily.' Whatever its analytical skills may be, the profession fails
ignominiously in expressing new standards of conduct in statutory form.
It would be pleasant to assign this failure to the habit patterns of the profession: a carry-over from complaint writing where redundant terminology
2
hides a cause of action in abstruse, archaic, and incomprehensible verbiage.
Or it might be blamed on "form book practice"-in legislation, the copying of statutes from other states without regard for their merit. Or the
fault might be placed on the practitioner's contempt for the legislative process. But these are too easy answers.
The responsibility must come back to the teaching profession. We,
in large measure, determine the approach, the cast of mind, the method,
and the skills of the bar. True, the current bar is not our product but
that of our predecessors. True also, our predecessors were more contemptuous of the legislative process and all "practical matters" than are
we. But it remains a fact that too large a percentage of the teaching profession is still contemptuous of all forms of legal drafting because (1) it is
beneath our dignity, (2) it does not develop analytical skills, (3) it is so
simple that it can be learned better in practice, (4) it is not one of our
skills, or (5) it is too much like teaching Freshman Composition if we have
to correct the student's drafts.3 Whatever the reason, the result is that
few law graduates in modem times have been prepared to draft legislation
or any other legal document.
Against this background Reed Dickerson has had the temerity to
publish a small volume devoted exclusively to the problem of Legislative
Drafting. If words speak as loud as actions it will receive rough treatment
at the hands of the sophisticates. For myself, I find it a welcome addition
1. Represented principally by groups specializing in the statutory field, i.e., The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Legislative
Reference Services of the two Houses of Congress and the Library of Congress, the
New York Law Revision Commission, and staffs of some of the state Legislative
Councils and Legislative Reference Bureaus.
2. This of course is unnecessary in the first place. See, PANTZER AND O'NEAL,
THE DRAFTING OF CORPORATE CHARTERS AND

BY-LAws

(1951).

3. But a few have been willing to accept the burdens: Since the 1937 Indiana University Law School has required first year students to draft a bill and a committee
report as a part of the course in legislation, or in the course in first year research.
At Ohio State, "In the third year, the methods of instruction are those of problem
solving . . . and legal drafting . . . and planning." 52 OHIo ST. UNIv. BuLL.
9 (No. 6, Jan. 15, 1953); at Nebraska "The course [Legislative Laboratory] includes the preparation and analysis of social science data upon which the need for
legislation is bottomed . . . the drafting of legislation to achieve the objectives; the
preparation of legal memoranda in support of the validity of proposed legislation,
and of reports for submission to legislative bodies." 58 UNIV. OF NEB. BULL. 19
(No. 5, Feb. 21, 1953). The Law School of the University of Pennsylvania offers a
course in legislation dealing in "legislative method, organization and procedure;
policy formulation; form and style of statutes; drafting; sanctions." 54 U. OF PA.
BULL. 37 (No. 14, Jan. 29, 1954).
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to the literature. It is not startlingly new; it is not revolutionary; it is
perhaps no better than Coode, 4 Ilbert, 5 or Jones," but it is both "up-to-date"
and "in print" which the others are not. I venture to say that its severest
critics can learn much from it and none could do a better job of drafting
7
than has its author.
The book is divided into three parts: "What Legislative Drafting is
About," "How to Draft," and "What to Say." The content of these three
parts is heavily influenced by Mr. Dickerson's experience as Assistant
Legislative Counsel of the House of Representatives and as Chief of the
Codification Section, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense.
In other words, some of his suggestions are practical only when they concern departmental legislation proposed and sponsored in the Congress of
the United States.
The first part, "What Legislative Drafting is About," attempts in five
and a quarter pages to orient the lawyer as to his place in the drafting
process. It emphasizes, as all writers have, that the draftsman should not
determine policy. In terms of basic objectives this is true; but the point
should also be emphasized that at the level of secondary policy the draftsman should inject his professional skill. The objective of the bill can often
be furthered and its chance of enactment improved by the type of legal
controls selected, by the form of its standards, and by the kind of sanctions
selected.8 The final choice should be the client's, but the draftsman's
knowledge and experience should make the clients' decision an informed
one.

The second part, "How to Draft," deals with the importance of research and conference in the drafting process. The author's reproduction
of Professor Jones' case study on time allocation for research, conference,
and drafting should convince the most skeptical.9 It is true as Dickerson
says that clients often expect "a draft by Thursday noon"; but what is more
discouraging is that most draftsmen think that they can finish it Wednesday
evening.
Too frequently the draftsman's concept of research is to look for a
"case in point" which, when applied to bill drafting, means copying a statute
from another jurisdiction. This most certainly is not research. It is nothing more than copying atrocities of form and language in the vain belief that
4. LEGISLATivE ExIREssloN (1848).

5.

LEGISLATIVE METHODS AND FORMS

6. STATUTE LAW MAKING IN

(1901).

THE UNITED STATES

(1912).

7. For example see the work of the author and his associates, PROPOSED CoDn'cATION OF THE LAWS RELATING TO THE ARMED FoRcEs vols. I-V (H.R. Comm. on
Judiciary, Comm. Print, 1954).

8. Unfortunately these problems are but briefly mentioned; obviously, Dickerson
could not discuss all of the facets of drafting in so compact a book, but it is in this
area that draftsmen are most deficient. Landis, The Study of Legislation in Law
Schools, 39 HARV. GRAD. MAG. 433 (1931) ; Horack, Can American State Legislatures
Keep Pacet, 26 Rocxy MT. L. REV. 468 (1954).
9. Jones, Some Reflections on a Draftsman's Time Sheet, 35 A.B.A.J. 941

(1949).
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if the statute has been judicially interpreted, that security is preferable to
mediocrity.
Dickerson emphasizes the desirability of drafting as a team operation.
This view is certainly acceptable, but it is not easy of achievement when
drafting for non-governmental groups at the state level. Under these
circumstances, the preparation of a bill is usually a one man task. But this
should put a greater responsibility on the draftsman to try his draft out in
conference and to include persons with as many different points of view
in the conference as possible. Furthermore, when the final draft is complete the draftsman should insist that his client submit the draft to the
opposition. Too frequently, both draftsman and client treat the bill as
highly confidential and try to conceal its existence from known opposing
groups. This is folly of the worst order. It merely gives to the opposition
an irrelevant argument-that the bill must be bad because its introduction
is secretive. 10 It also injures the bill's chance of enactment, for not infrequently many minor objections can be eliminated prior to introduction,
thereby reducing argument and uncontrolled amendment from the floor.
The coordination of conflicting governmental interests is regularized in the
federal system by clearance through the Legislative Reference Division
of the Bureau of the Budget; for private legislation either at the federal
level or in the states it is the responsibility of the draftsman to "educate"
his client to the advantages of the "pre-trial conference" in the legislative
area.
The first two parts of Dickerson's book, together with its excellent
introduction, contain the experience of an expert; the experienced draftsman will recognize it as sound advice to the neophyte. Perhaps I share
with Beaman the doubt that the inexperienced will profit from anything
but experience. This is the discouraging part of the whole process, for
there are so few competent draftsmen that the apprenticeship system is more
likely to produce incompetent draftsmen than it is to improve the bill drafting process.
The third part, "What to Say," will no doubt be looked upon as the
"meat" of the book. In one sense this is true, for no matter how careful
the research, no matter how illuminating the conferences, if the ultimate
decisions are not transposed into a draft consistent and accurate in form,
the result is still a failure. If anyone should be so bold as to assert that
the suggestions on arrangement, brevity, style and grammar, specific word
form, and general writing problems are too elementary, let him read the
session laws of any state for any year. Dickerson's material on specific
word form is particularly good and, although he presents it as suggestive
only, it should be accepted as mandatory by all but the veteran draftsman.
10. The Indiana practice is to introduce all bills, regardless of length, on a
four page folio. I have known "draftsmen" to deliberately write enough to fill the
first three pages in an endeavor to discourage the reading of the fourth page; invariably the "legislative news bulletins" published by the lobbying organizations

carry careful analyses of the content of the fourth page. But the draftsmen never
seem to learn.
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One final word. Dickerson suggests a "basic library" for the draftsman." His selection is excellent, but it is beyond the means of all but the
large law office and the governmental department. For the average practitioner three books, well read and understood, will go far toward improving his competence. They are: Hurst, The Growth of American Law:
The Law Makers (1950); Gross, The Legislative Struggle (1953); and
Dickerson, Legislative Drafting.
Frank E. Horack Jr.t
11. Page 19. In addition three appendices, pp. 115-29, include a description of
federal statute law, a table of state constitutional provisions, and a selected bibliography
of books, articles, and drafting manuals.
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.

